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Abstract. Classical voting rules assume that ballots are complete preference or-
ders over candidates. However, when the number of candidates is large enough,
it is too costly to ask the voters to rank all candidates. We suggest to fix a rank
k, to ask all voters to specify their best k candidates, and then to consider “top-k
approximations” of rules, which take only into account the top-k candidates of
each ballot. We consider two measures of the quality of the approximation: the
probability of selecting the same winner as the original rule, and the score ratio.
We do a worst-case study (for the latter measure only), and for both measures, an
average-case study and a study from real data sets.
Keywords: Voting rules · Truncated ballots · Approximations.
1 Introduction
The input of a voting rule is usually a collection of complete rankings over candidates
(although there are exceptions, such as approval voting). However, requiring a voter to
provide a complete ranking over the whole set of candidates can be difficult and costly
in terms of time and cognitive effort. We suggest to ask voters to report only their top-k
candidates, for some (small) fixed value of k (the obtained ballots are then said to be top-
k). Not only it saves communication effort, but it is also often easier for a voter to find
out the top part of their preference relation than the bottom part. However, this raises
the issue of how usual voting rules should be adapted to top-k ballots. Reporting top-k
ballots is a specific form of voting with incomplete preferences, and is highly related to
vote elicitation. Work on these topics is reviewed in the recent handbook chapter [5].
Existing work on truncated ballots can be classified into two classes according to the
type of interaction with the voters:
(i) Interactive elicitation
An interactive elicitation protocol asks voters to expand their truncated ballots in an
incremental way, until the outcome of the vote is eventually determined. This line of
research starts with Kalech et al. [14] who start by top-1 ballots, then top-2, etc., until
there is sufficient information for knowing the winner. Lu and Boutilier [17,16] pro-
pose an incremental elicitation process using minimax regret to predict the correct win-
ner given partial information. A more general incremental elicitation framework, with
more types of elicitation questions, is cost-effective elicitation [25]. Naamani Dery et al.
[10] present two elicitation algorithms for finding a winner with little communication
between voters.
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(ii) Non-interactive elicitation
The central authority elicits the top-k ballots at once, for a fixed value of k, and
outputs a winner without requiring voters to provide extra information. A possibility
consists in computing possible winners given these truncated ballots: this is the path
followed by Baumeister et al. [2] (who also consider double-truncated ballots where
each voter ranks some of her top and bottom candidates). Another possibility – which
is the one follow – consists in generalizing the definition of a voting rule so that it
takes truncated ballots as input. In this line, Oren et al. [21] analyze top-k voting by
assessing the values of k needed to ensure the true winner is found with high probability
for specific preference distributions. Skowron et al. [23] use top-k voting as a way
to approximate some multiwinner rules. Filmus and Oren [12] study the performance
of top-k voting under the impartial culture distribution for the Borda, Harmonic and
Copeland rules. They assess the values of k needed to find the true winner with high
probability, and they report on numerical experiments that show that under the impartial
culture, top-k ballots for reasonable small values of k give accurate results.
Bentert and Skowron [3] focus on top-k approximations of voting rules that are
defined via the maximization of a score (positional scoring rules and maximin). They
evaluate the quality of the approximation of a voting rule by a top-k rule by the worst-
case ratio between the scores, with respect to the original profile, of the winner of the
original rule and the winner of the approximate rule. They identify the top-k rules that
best approximate positional scoring rules (we give more details in Section 5). Their
theoretical analysis is completed by numerical experiments using profiles generated
from different distributions over preferences: they show that for the Borda rule a small
value of k is needed to achieve a high approximation guarantee while maximin needs
more information from a sufficiently many voters to determine the winner.
Ayadi et al. [1] evaluate the extent to which STV with top-k ballots approximates
STV with full information. They show that for small k, top-k ballots are enough to
identify the correct winner quite frequently, especially for data taken from real elections.
Finally, the recognition of singled-peaked top-k profiles is studied in [15] while the
computational issues of manipulating rules with top-k profiles is addressed in [20].
Our contribution concerns non-interactive elicitation. We adapt different voting rules
to truncated ballots: we define approximations of voting rules which take as input the
top-k candidates of each ballot. The question is then, are these approximations good
predictors of the original rule? We answer this question by considering two measures:
the probability that the approximate rule selects the ‘true’ winner, and the ratio between
the scores (for the original rule) of the true winner and the winner of the approximate
rule. For the latter measure we give a worst-case theoretical analysis. For both mea-
sures we give an empirical study, based on randomly generated profiles and on real-
world data. Our findings are that for several common voting rules, both for randomly
generated profiles and real data, a very small k suffices.
Our research can be seen as a continuation of Filmus and Oren [12]. We go further
on several points: we consider more voting rules; beyond impartial culture, we consider
a large scope of distributions; we study score distortion; and we include experiments
using real-world data sets. Our work is also closely related to [3], who have obtained
related results independently (see Sections 4 and 5 for a discussion).
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Our interpretation of top-k ballots is epistemic: the central authority in charge of
collecting the votes and computing the outcome ignores the voters’ preferences below
the top-k candidates of each voter, and has to cope with it as much as possible. Voters
may very well have a complete preference order in their head (although it does not need
to be the case), but they will simply not be asked to report it.
Section 2 gives some background. Section 3 defines top-k approximations of differ-
ent voting rules. Section 4 analyses empirically the probability that approximate rules
select the true winner. Section 5 analyses score distortion, theoretically and empirically.
2 Preliminaries
An election is a triple E = 〈N,A, P 〉 where: N = {1, ..., n} is the set of voters, A is
the set of candidates, with |A| = m; and P = (1, ...,n) is the preference profile
of voters in N , where for each i, i∈ P is a linear order over A. Pm is the set of all
profiles over m alternatives (for varying n).
Given a profile P , NP (a, b) = # {i, a i b} is the number of voters who prefer a
to b in P . The majority graph M(P ) is the graph whose set of vertices is the set of the
candidates A and in which for all a, b ∈ A, there is a directed edge from a to b (denoted
by a→ b) in M(P ) if Np(a, b) > n2 .
A resolute voting rule is a function f : E → A. Resolute rules are typically obtained
from composing an irresolute rule (mapping an election into an non-empty subset of
candidates, called co-winners) with a tie-breaking mechanism.
A positional scoring rule (PSR) fs is defined by a non-negative vector s = (s1, ..., sm)
such that s1 ≥ ... ≥ sm and s1 > 0. Each candidate receives sj points from each voter
i who ranks her in the jth position, and the score of a candidate is the total number of
points she receives from all voters i.e. S(x) =
∑n
i=1 sj . The winner is the candidate
with highest total score. Examples of scoring rules are the Borda and Harmonic rules,
with sBorda = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0) and sHarmonic = (1, 1/2, . . . , 1/m).
We now define three pairwise comparison rules.
The Copeland rule outputs the candidate maximizing the Copeland score, where
the Copeland score of x is the number of candidates y with x → y in M(P ), plus half
the number of candidates y 6= x with no edge between x and y in M(P ).
The Ranked Pairs (RP) rule proceeds by ranking all pairs of candidates (x, y) ac-
cording toNP (x, y) (using tie-breaking when necessary); starting from an empty graph
over A, it then considers all pairs in the described order and includes a pair in the graph
if and only if it does not create a cycle in it. At the end of the process, the graph is a
complete ranking, whose top element is the winner.
The maximin rule outputs the candidates that maximize minx∈A(x 6=a)NP (a, x).
For the experiments using randomly generated profiles, we use the Mallows φ-
model [18]. It is a (realistic) family of distributions over rankings, parametrized by a
modal or reference ranking σ and a dispersion parameter φ ∈ [0, 1]: P (r;σ, φ) =
1
Zφ
d(r,σ), where r is any ranking, d is the Kendall tau distance and Z =
∑
r′ φ
d(r,σ) =
1 · (1 + φ) · (1 + φ+ φ2) · ... · (1 + ...+ φm−1) is a normalization constant. With
small values of φ, the mass is concentrated around σ, while φ = 1 gives the uniform
distribution Impartial Culture (IC), where all profiles are equiprobable.
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3 Approximating Voting Rules from Truncated Ballots
Given k ∈ {1, ...,m− 1}, a top-k election is a triple E′ = 〈N,A,R〉 where N and
A are as before, and R = (k1 , ...,kn), where each ki is a ranking of k out of m
candidates in A. R is called a top-k profile. If P is a complete profile, ki is the top-k
truncation of i (i.e., the best k candidates, ranked as in i), and Pk = (k1 , ...,kn) is
the top-k-profile induced from P and k. A top-k (resolute) voting rule is a function fk
that maps each top-k election E′ to a candidate in A. We sometimes apply a top-k rule
to a complete profile, with fk(P ) = fk(Pk). We now define several top-k rules.
3.1 Borda and Positional Scoring Rules
Definition 1. A top-k PSR fsk is defined by a scoring vector s = (s1, s2 . . . , sk, s∗)
such that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ ... ≥ sk ≥ s∗ ≥ 0 and s1 > s∗. Each candidate in a top-k vote
receives sj points from each voter i who ranks her in the jth position. A non-ranked
candidate gets s∗ points. The winner is the candidate with highest total score.
When starting from a specific PSR for complete ballots, defined by scoring vector
s = (s1, . . . , sm), two choices of s∗ particularly make sense:
– zero score: s∗ = 0
– average score: s∗ = 1m−k (sk+1 + . . .+ sm)
We denote the corresponding approximate rules as f0k and f
av
k . Borda
av
k is known
under the name average score modified Borda Count [8,13], while Borda0k is known
under the name modified Borda Count [11]). In the experiments we report only on
Bordaavk , as Borda
0
k gives very similar results.
Young [24] characterized positional scoring rules by these four properties, which
we describe informally (for resolute rules):
– Neutrality: all candidates are treated equally
– Anonymity: all voters are treated equally
– Reinforcement: if P and Q are two profiles (on disjoint electorates) and x is the
winner for P and the winner for Q, then it is also the winner for P ∪Q.
– Continuity: if P and Q are two profiles and x is the winner for P but not for Q,
adding sufficiently many votes of P to Q leads to elect x.
f is a PSR if and only if it satisfies neutrality, anonymity, reinforcement and conti-
nuity [24].
These four properties still make sense for truncated ballots. It is not difficult to
generalize Young’s result to top-k PSR:
Theorem 1. A top-k voting rule is a top-k PSR if and only if it satisfies neutrality,
anonymity, reinforcement, and continuity.
Proof. The left-to-right direction is obvious. For the right-to-left direction, let us first
define the top-k-only property: a standard voting rule is top-k-only if for any two com-
plete profiles P, P ′, if Pk = P ′k, then F (P ) = F (P
′). Then (1) a positional scoring rule
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F is top-k-only if and only if sk+1 = . . . = sm (if this equality is not satisfied, then it is
easy to construct two profiles P , P ′ such that Pk = P ′k and F (P ) 6= F (P ′)). Now, as-
sume Fk is a top-k rule satisfying neutrality, anonymity, reinforcement, and continuity.
Let F be the standard voting rule defined by F (P ) = Fk(Pk). Clearly, F also satisfies
neutrality, anonymity, reinforcement, and continuity, and due to Young’s characteriza-
tion result, F is a PSR, associated with some vector (s1, . . . , sm). Because F is also
top-k-only, using (1) we have sk+1 = . . . = sm, therefore, Fk is a top-k-PSR.
3.2 Rules Based on Pairwise Comparisons
Given a truncated ballot ki and two candidates a, b ∈ A, we say that a dominates b in
ki , denoted by a >ki b, if one of these two conditions holds: (1) a and b are listed in
ki , and a ki b; (2) a is listed in ki , and b is not.
For instance, for A = {a, b, c, d}, k = 2, and 2i= (a  b), then a dominates b,
both a and b dominate c and d, but c and d remain incomparable in2i . Now, the notions
of pairwise comparison and majority graph are extended to top-k truncated profiles in
a straightforward way:
Definition 2. Given a top-k profile R, NR(a, b) = #
{
i, a >ki b
}
is the number of
voters in R for whom a dominates b. The top-k majority graph Mk(R) induced by R
is the graph whose set of vertices is the set of the candidates A and in which there is a
directed edge from a to b if NR(a, b) > NR(b, a).
The top-k rules Copelandk, Maximink and RPk are defined exactly as their stan-
dard counterparts, but starting from the top-k pairwise comparisons and majority graph
instead of the standard ones. Note that fm−1 = f , and (for all rules f we consider) f1
coincides with plurality.
Example 1. Let us consider this 62-voter profile: 20 votes a  d  c  b, 10 votes
b  c  d  a, 15 votes c  d  b  a and 17 votes: d  c  a  b.
a b c d MP
a - 20 20 10 10
b 10 - 10 10 10
c 42 32 - 25 25
d 32 52 37 - 32
(b) Maximin2(a) Copeland2
Fig. 1: top-2 approximations of Copeland and Maximin
Fig. 1 (a) shows the top-k majority graph and the Copeland winner for k = 2, and
Fig. 1 (b) shows the top-k pairwise majority matrix and the Maximink winner for
k = 2. In both cases, the winner for k = 1 (resp. k = 3) is a (resp. d). For RP, the
winner under RPk for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} is the same as the winner under Copelandk since
the k-truncated majority graph does not create cycles.
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4 Probability of Selecting the True Winner
The first way of measuring the quality of the top-k approximations is to determine the
probability that they output the ‘true winner’; that is, the winner of the original voting
rule, under various distributions (Subsection 4.1) and for real-world data (Subsection
4.2). In both cases, the procedure is similar: given a voting rule f , we consider many
profiles, and for each profile P we compare f(P ) to fk(Pk) for each k = {1, . . . ,m−
2}. The difference between Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 is that in the former we randomly
draw profiles according to a given distribution, and for the latter, we draw a profile
by selecting n votes at random in the database. We include in our experiments STVk
rule defined by Ayadi et al. [1], which takes top-k ballots as input; and we compared
it to our truncated rules. STVk proceeds as follows: in each round the candidate with
the smallest number of votes is eliminated (using a tie breaking when necessary), if
all ranked candidates are eliminated by STV, the vote is then ‘exhausted’ and ignored
during further counting.
4.1 Experiments Using Mallows Model
Here we follow the research direction initiated by Filmus and Oren [12], but we con-
sider more rules, and beyond Impartial Culture we also consider correlated distributions
within the Mallows model.For each experiment we draw 1000 random preference pro-
files. In the first set of experiments, we takem = 7, we let n and φ vary, and we measure
the accuracy of the approximate rule for k = 1 and k = 2. Results are reported on Ta-
ble 1. Note that for k = 1, our results can be viewed as answering the question: with
which probability does the true winner with respect to the chosen rule coincide with the
plurality winner?
Table 1: Success rate, Mallows model: m = 7, varying n, k and φ.
φ n=100 n=200 n=300 n=400 n=500 n=100 n=200 n=300 n=400 n=500
Bordaav1 Borda
av
2
0.7 0.902 0.958 0.986 0.992 1.0 0.951 0.98 0.992 1.0 1.0
0.8 0.77 0.855 0.9 0.94 0.963 0.853 0.913 0.956 0.972 0.986
0.9 0.588 0.694 0.685 0.718 0.771 0.772 0.805 0.827 0.846 0.873
1 0.434 0.445 0.424 0.422 0.397 0.576 0.56 0.586 0.598 0.584
Copeland1 Copeland2
0.7 0.908 0.968 0.991 0.994 1.0 0.947 0.99 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.8 0.736 0.847 0.891 0.934 0.949 0.822 0.904 0.952 0.984 0.982
0.9 0.497 0.567 0.655 0.684 0.726 0.62 0.69 0.77 0.805 0.838
1 0.325 0.332 0.323 0.343 0.319 0.458 0.432 0.45 0.442 0.425
Maximin1 Maximin2
0.7 0.908 0.969 0.986 0.99 1.0 0.968 0.991 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.8 0.787 0.856 0.915 0.939 0.955 0.872 0.934 0.961 0.976 0.977
0.9 0.57 0.633 0.691 0.717 0.748 0.735 0.76 0.794 0.838 0.869
1 0.415 0.4 0.423 0.393 0.391 0.52 0.532 0.544 0.545 0.525
Harmonic1 Harmonic2
0.7 0.941 0.986 0.996 1.0 1.0 0.98 0.992 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.8 0.895 0.916 0.958 0.959 0.968 0.958 0.974 0.987 0.988 0.996
0.9 0.805 0.808 0.83 0.866 0.863 0.895 0.921 0.934 0.939 0.952
1 0.725 0.742 0.74 0.697 0.737 0.872 0.867 0.859 0.861 0.859
RP1 RP2
0.7 0.926 0.972 0.995 0.995 1.0 0.963 0.994 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.8 0.778 0.856 0.908 0.939 0.957 0.871 0.928 0.967 0.983 0.989
0.9 0.587 0.64 0.674 0.718 0.749 0.725 0.765 0.777 0.838 0.862
1 0.426 0.405 0.416 0.375 0.385 0.558 0.524 0.557 0.498 0.519
STV1 STV2
0.7 0.907 0.981 0.985 0.998 1.0 0.959 0.993 0.997 1.0 1.0
0.8 0.808 0.865 0.917 0.918 0.943 0.882 0.933 0.962 0.966 0.974
0.9 0.603 0.64 0.721 0.729 0.763 0.742 0.776 0.792 0.855 0.846
1 0.45 0.464 0.477 0.471 0.468 0.576 0.593 0.61 0.592 0.585
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For k = 1: when n ≤ 100 and φ ≤ 0.7, prediction reaches 90% for Borda,
Copeland, Maximin and STV, 92% for RP, and 94% for Harmonic. When n ≥ 500,
the accuracy is perfect for all rules. For φ = 0.8, the success rate decreases but results
are still good with a large number of voters. For φ = 0.9 and n = 500, the rate reaches
86% for Harmonic and 72% for Copeland, with intermediate (and similar) results for
Borda, Maximin and RP and STV. For the IC, the rate decreases dramatically when k
becomes small, except for Harmonic (73% when n = 500 against 46% for STV, 31%
for Copeland and 40% for the remaining rules).
For k = 2: the probability of selecting the true winner reaches 100% (resp. 98%)
when φ ≤ 0.7 (resp. φ ≤ 0.8) and n ≥ 400 (resp. n ≥ 500). With high values of φ,
Harmonic still outperforms other rules followed by Bordaav and STV then the other
rules. Consistently with the results obtained by Bentert and Skowron [3] for the IC,
approximating the maximin rule is harder than position scoring rules where maximin
needs more information from the voters in order to obtain high approximation guaran-
tees. In all cases, top-2 ballots seem to be always sufficient in practice to predict the
winner with 100% accuracy with a low value of φ.
In the second set of experiments, we are interested in determining the value of k
needed to predict the correct winner with large elections and with high value of φ. We
take k = {1, ...,m}, n = 2000, φ = {0.9, 1} and m = 20. Fig. 2 shows depicted re-
sults where 1000 random preference profiles are generated for each experiment. Results
suggest that in large elections and unless φ is very high (φ = 0.9), top-k rules are able
to identify the true winner when k = 6 (resp. k = 8) for Harmonic (resp. the remaining
rules) out of m = 20. We can also observe the behavior of different truncated rules
when φ = 0.9: the best accuracy is obtained again by Harmonic and the accuracy of all
other rules are very close, which we found surprising. When φ = 1, the latter behavior
changes: Harmonic still has the best results, followed by Bordaav and STV, then the
remaining rules. The good performance of Harmonic in all cases can be explained by
the fact that the closer the scoring vector to plurality, the better the prediction.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
k
(a) φ = 0.9
0.4
0.5
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Bordaav
Copeland
Maximin
RP
Harmonicav
STV
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
k
(b) φ = 1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fig. 2: Success rate, Mallows model: n = 2000, m = 20, varying φ and k.
Next, for each value of n ∈ {1000, 2000}, φ ∈ {.7, .8, .9, 1}, andm ∈ {7, 10, 15, 20},
we generated 1000 random profiles, and for each of our rules, we determined the mini-
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mal value k (as a function of m) such that the winner is correctly determined from the
top-k votes for all generated profiles. The results for Bordaav are:
– for φ = 0.7, k = 1 is always sufficient, whatever m.
– for φ = 0.8, k = 2 (resp. k = 1) is always sufficient for n = 1000 (resp. n =
2000), whatever the value of m.
– for φ = 0.9, we observe that the minimal value of k such that the correct winner is
always correctly predicted is around 710m (for n = 1000) and
2
5m (for n = 2000).
– for φ = 1, the minimal value of k is m− 1: we always find a generated profile for
which we get an incorrect result if the profile is not complete.
The results for Copeland, maximin, RP and STV are similar to those for Borda. For
Harmonic, we observe that k = 1 is always sufficient for φ ≤ 0.8 and n = 2000, and
that for φ = 0.9 (resp. φ = 1), the value of k needed is around 13m (resp.
2
3m).
In order to see how our approximations behave with small number of voters and a
high dispersion parameter, we take k = {1, ...,m}, n = 15, m = 7, and φ ∈ {0.9, 1}.
The results are on Fig. 3. The worst performance is obtained with Copeland, while the
other rules perform more or less equally well. These results are consistent with the re-
sults obtained by Skowron et al. [23] for multiwinner rules: elections with few voters
and high dispersion appear to be the worst-case scenario for predicting the correct win-
ner using top-truncated ballots. For Harmonic, even with few voters, winner prediction
is almost perfect when k = 4 and m = 7.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
k
(a) φ = 0.9
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0.6
0.8
1.0
Su
cce
ss
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Bordaav
Copeland
Maximin
RP
Harmonicav
STV
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
k
(b) φ = 1 (IC)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fig. 3: Success rate, Mallows model: m = 7, n = 15, varying φ and k.
4.2 Experiments Using Real Data Sets
We now consider real data set from Preflib [19]: 2002 election for Dublin North con-
stituency with 12 candidates and 3662 voters. We consider data with samples of n∗
voters among n (n∗ < n), starting by n∗ = 10 and increment n∗ in steps of 10. In
each experiment, 1000 random profiles are constructed with n∗ voters; then we con-
sider the top-k ballots obtained from these profiles, with k = {1, 2, 3}, and we compute
the frequency with which we select the true winner. Fig. 4 shows results for Dublin
with small elections (n∗ = {10, ..., 100}) while Fig. 5 presents results for large elec-
tions (n∗ = {100, ..., 2000}). Arrows indicate the number of voters from which the
prediction is perfect.
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Consistently with the results of Fig. 3, for small elections; the success rate is low
when k is too small, except for Harmonic where it gives the best performance followed
by STV (especially when n∗ < 60) then the remaining rules, e.g. For Harmonic (resp.
STV), 92% (resp. 82%) accuracy is reached with k = 3, m = 12 and n∗ = 50 against
around 75% for the remaining rules.
20 40 60 80 100
voters
(a) Top-1 truncated ballots
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Su
cce
ss
pro
ba
bil
ity
20 40 60 80 100
voters
(b) Top-2 truncated ballots
20 40 60 80 100
voters
(c) Top-3 truncated ballots
Bordaav
Copeland
Maximin
RP
Harmonicav
STV
Fig. 4: Success rate, Dublin, varying k; n∗ = {10, . . . , 100}.
500 1000 1500 2000
voters
(a) Top-1 truncated ballots
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Su
cce
ss
pro
ba
bil
ity ≈ 1240 ≈ 1330
500 1000 1500 2000
voters
(b) Top-2 truncated ballots
≈ 670 ≈ 800
500 1000 1500 2000
voters
(c) Top-3 truncated ballots
≈ 570 ≈ 800
Bordaav
Copeland
Maximin
RP
Harmonicav
STV
Fig. 5: Success rate, Dublin, varying k; n∗ = {100, . . . , 2000}.
For large elections, when k = 1, the different approximations exhibit almost the
same behavior except Harmonic, that performs better especially with few voters. Ob-
viously, increasing the value of k leads to a decrease in the number of voters needed
for correct winner selection. In general, the different approximations needs a sufficient
number of voters to converge to the correct prediction. Scoring rules tend to require less
voters.
5 Measuring the Approximation Ratio
5.1 Worst Case Study
In order to measure the quality of approximate voting rules whose definition is based
on score maximization, a classical method consists in computing the worst-case ap-
proximation ratio between the scores (for the original rule) of the ‘true’ winner and of
the winner of the approximate rule. Using worst-case score ratios is classical: they are
defined for measuring the quality of approximate voting rules [7,22], for defining the
price of anarchy of a voting rule [6] or for measuring the distortion of a voting rule [4].
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Worst-case score ratios particularly make sense if the score of a candidate is mean-
ingful beyond its use for determining the winner. This is definitely the case for Borda,
as the Borda count is often seen as a measure of social welfare (see [9]). This worst-case
score ratio is called the price of top-k truncation.
Definition 3. Let f be a voting rule defined as the maximization of a score S, and fk a
top-k approximation of f . The price of top-k-truncation for f , fk, m, and k, is defined
as: R(f, fk,m, k) = maxP∈Pm
S(f(P ))
S(fk(Pk))
.
Positional Scoring Rules
Let fs be a positional scoring rule defined with scoring vector s. Assume the
tie-breaking priority favors x1. Let f s¯k be a top-k approximation of f
s, associated
with vector s¯ = (s1, . . . , sk, s∗), with the same tie-breaking priority. Let s′ = (s1 −
s∗, . . . , sk − s∗, 0) = (s′1, . . . , s′k, 0), i.e., s′i = si − s∗ for i = 1, . . . , k. Obviously,
f s¯k = f
s′
k . For instance, if f
s¯ is the average-score approximation of the Borda rule, then
s¯ = (m− 1, . . . ,m− k, m−k−12 ) and s′ = (m− 1− m−k−12 , . . . ,m− k− m−k−12 , 0).
Let S(x, P ) be the score of x for P under fs and S′k(x, Pk) be the score of x for
Pk under fs
′
k . From now on when we write scores we omit P and Pk, i.e., we write
S(x) instead of S(x, P ), S′k(x) instead of S
′
k(x, Pk) etc. In the rest of Subsection 5.1
we assume k ≥ 2. Let x1 = fs′k (Pk) and x2 = fs(P ).
Lemma 1. R(fs, fs
′
k ,m, k) ≤ 1− sk+1s′1 +
(
1 + s
∗
s′1
)
msk+1
s′1+...+s
′
k
Proof. The total number of points given to candidates under fs
′
k is n(s
′
1 + . . . + s
′
k),
therefore S′k(x1) ≥ nm (s′1 + . . .+ s′k).
Let us write S(x2) = S1→k(x2)+Sk+1→m(x2), where S1→k(x2) (resp. Sk+1→m(x2))
is the number of points that x2 gets from the top k (resp. bottom m − k) positions of
the ballots in P . Let γ be the number of ballots in which x2 is not in the top k positions.
Then Sk+1→m(x2) ≤ γsk+1.
As x2 appears in at least
S′k(x2)
s′1
top-k ballots, we have γ ≤ n − S′k(x2)s′1 . Moreover
we have S(x1) ≥ S1→k(x1) = S′k(x1) + ns∗ ≥ S′k(x2) + ns∗ = S1→k(x2). Now,
S(x2) ≤ S1→k(x2) +
(
n− S′k(x2)s′1
)
sk+1
≤ S1→k(x2) +
(
n− Sk(x2)−ns∗s′1
)
sk+1
≤ (1− sk+1s′1 )S1→k(x2) + nsk+1 +
ns∗sk+1
s′1
≤ (1− sk+1s′1 )S(x1) + nsk+1 +
ns∗sk+1
s′1
S(x2)
S(x1)
≤ 1− sk+1s′1 + nsk+1(1 +
s∗
s′1
) mn(s′1+...+s′k)
≤ 1− sk+1s′1 + sk+1(1 +
s∗
s′1
) ms′1+...+s′k
We now focus on the lower bound. We build the following pathological complete
profile P such that:
– the winner for Pk (resp. P ) is x1 (resp. x2).
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– in Pk, all candidates get the same number of points (x1 wins thanks to tie-breaking),
and x1 and x2 get all their points from top-1 positions.
– in P , the score of x1 is minimized by ranking it last everywhere where it was not
in the top k positions, and the score of x2 is maximized by ranking it in position
k + 1 everywhere where it was not in the top k positions.
– Pk is symmetric in {x3, . . . , xm}.
Formally, Pk is defined as follows:
1. for each ranked list L (resp. L′) of k − 1 (resp. k) candidates in {x3, . . . , xm}: α
votes x1L and α votes x2L (resp. β votes L′). α and β will be fixed later.
2. α and β are chosen in such a way that all candidates get the same score S′k(.).
Now, P is obtained by completing Pk as follows:
1. each top-k vote x1L is completed into x1Lx2−. “−” means the remaining candi-
dates are in an arbitrary order.
2. each top-k vote x2L is completed into x2L− x1.
3. each top-k vote L′ is completed into L′x2 − x1.
For instance, for m = 5 and k = 3, P is as follows:
α x1x3x4x2x5
α x1x3x5x2x4
α x1x4x3x2x5
α x1x4x5x2x3
α x1x5x3x2x4
α x1x5x4x2x3
α x2x3x4x5x1
α x2x3x5x4x1
α x2x4x3x5x1
α x2x4x5x3x1
α x2x5x3x4x1
α x2x5x4x3x1
β x3x4x5x2x1
β x3x5x4x2x1
β x4x3x5x2x1
β x4x5x3x2x1
β x5x3x4x2x1
β x5x4x3x2x1
Let M = (m−3)!(m−k−1)! and Q =
(m−2)!
(m−k−1)! .
Lemma 2.
S′k(x1) = S
′
k(x2) = α(m− 2)s′1M
and for i ≥ 3, S′k(xi) = 2α(s′2 + . . .+ s′k)M + β(m− k − 1)(s′1 + . . .+ s′k)M
Proof. In Pk, x1 and x2 appear in top position in a number of votes equal to α times the
number of different permutations (ordered lists) of (k − 1) candidates out of (m − 2),
i.e. α (m−2)!(m−k−1)! times. Thus S
′
k(x1) = S
′
k(x2) = α
(m−2)!
(m−k−1)!s
′
1. For similar reasons, for
each i ≥ 3,
S′k(xi) = 2α
(m−3)!
(m−k−1)! (s
′
2 + · · ·+ s′k) + β (m−3)!(m−k−2)! (s′1 + · · ·+ s′k).
As a consequence, all candidates have the same score in Pk if and only if
β
α
=
(m− 2)s′1 − 2(s′2 + . . .+ s′k)
(m− k − 1)(s′1 + . . .+ s′k)
We fix α and β such that this equality holds. Thanks to the tie-breaking priority, the
winner in Pk is x1. In P , the winner is x2 and the scores of x1 and x2 are as follows:
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Lemma 3.
S(x1) = Qαs1
S(x2) = Qαs1 +Qαsk+1 +Q(m− k − 1)βsk+1
Proof. x1 appears at the top of
(m−2)!
(m−k−1)!α votes and at the bottom of all others, hence
S(x1) = Qαs1. x2 appears α
(m−2)!
(m−k−1)! times top position, and in position (k + 1) in
the remaining votes, i.e., α (m−2)!(m−k−1)! + β
(m−2)!
(m−k−2)! . Thus
S(x2) = α
(m−2)!
(m−k−1)! (s1 + sk+1) + β
(m−2)!
(m−k−2)!sk+1
Lemma 4. R(fs, fs
′
k ,m, k) ≥ 1− sk+1s1 +
sk+1
s1
ms′1
s′1+...+s
′
k
Proof. From Lemma 3 we get S(x2)S(x1) ≥ 1 +
sk+1
s1
+ (m− k − 1) sk+1s1
β
α .
Finally, using the expression of βα we get
S(x2)
S(x1)
≥ 1 + sk+1s1 + (m− k − 1)
sk+1
s1
(m−2)s′1−2(s′2+...+s′k)
(m−k−1)(s′1+...+s′k)
From this we conclude:
R(fs, fs
′
k ,m, k) ≥ 1 + sk+1s1 +
sk+1
s1
(m−2)s′1−2(s′2+...+s′k)
s′1+...+s
′
k
≥ 1 + sk+1s1 +
sk+1
s1
(m−2)s′1+2s′1−2(s′1+...+s′k)
s′1+...+s
′
k
≥ 1 + sk+1s1 +
sk+1
s1
(
ms′1
s′1+...+s
′
k
− 2
)
≥ 1− sk+1s1 +
sk+1
s1
ms′1
s′1+...+s
′
k
Putting Lemmas 1 and 4 together we get
Proposition 1.
1− sk+1s1 +
sk+1
s1
ms′1
s′1+...+s
′
k
≤ R(fs, fs′k ,m, k) ≤ 1− sk+1s′1 +
(
1 + s
∗
s′1
)
msk+1
s′1+...+s
′
k
Note that the lower and upper bound coincide when s∗ = 0, giving a tight worst-
case approximation ratio for this class of approximations. This is however not guar-
anteed when s∗ > 0 (the reason being that the pathological profile used in the proof
of Lemma 1 may not be the worst). Moreover, when s∗ = 0, our (lower and upper)
bound coincides with the optimal ratio given in [3] (Theorem 1).3 Since the ratio in [3]
is shown to be the best possible ratio, this show that taking s∗ = 0 gives a optimal top-k
approximation of a positional scoring rule.4
In particular:
3 Note that the ratios in our paper are the inverse of the ratios in [3]. That is, the inverse of the
ratio given in Theorem 1 of [3] coincides with our ratio for s∗ = 0.
4 Interestingly, [3] give another optimal rule (thus with same worst-case ratio), which is much
more complex, and which is not a top-k PSR. Comparing the average ratio of both rules is left
for further study.
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– for Borda0k (si = m − i, s∗ = 0), the lower and upper bounds coincide and are
equal to km−1 +
2m(m−k−1)
k(2m−k−1) .
– for Bordaavk (si = m − i, s∗ = m−k−1/2), the lower bound is 1 − m−k−1m−1 +
(m−k−1)(m+k−1)
k(m−1) and the upper bound is
k(3k−m+1)+4(m−k−1)(m−1)
k(m+k−1) .
– for Harmonic0k (si = 1/i, s∗ = 0), the lower and upper bounds are equal to
k
k+1 +
m
(k+1)(1+ 12 ···+ 1k )
.
Also, note that for k′-approval with k′ > k and s∗ = 0, the (exact) worst-case ratio
m
k does not depend on k
′. As a corollary, we get the following order of magnitudes
when m grows:
– R(Borda,Borda0k,m, k) = Θ
(
m
k
)
.
– R(Borda,Bordaavk ,m, k) = Θ
(
m
k
)
.
– R(Harmonic,Harmonic0k,m, k) = Θ
(
m
k log k
)
.
Maximin
LetMaximin be the Maximin rule with tie-breaking priority x1 . . . xm, andMaximink
be the k-truncated version of the Maximin rule with the same tie-breaking priority order.
Let SMm(x2, P ) and SMm(x1, Pk) be the Maximin scores of x2 and x1 for P and Pk,
respectively, with SMm(x2, P ) = miny 6=x2 NP (x2, y) and similarly for Pk. Let P be a
profile, and let x1 = Maximink(Pk) and x2 = Maximin(P ). All candidates have the
same Maximin score in Pk, therefore, by tie-breaking priority, Maximink(Pk) = x1.
Lemma 5. R(Maximin,Maximink,m, k) ≤ m− k + 1.
Proof. Because x1 = Maximink(Pk), we must have SMm(x1, Pk) ≥ 1 (otherwise
we would have SMm(x1, Pk) ≥ 0, meaning that x1 does not belong to any top-k bal-
lot, and in this case we cannot have x1 = Maximink(Pk)). Now, SMm(x2, P ) ≤
SMm(x2, Pk) + (m− k) ≤ SMm(x1, Pk) + (m− k), therefore,
SMm(x2,P )
SMm(x1,P )
≤ SMm(x1,Pk)+(m−k)SMm(x1,Pk)
≤ m− k + 1
Lemma 6. R(Maximin,Maximink,m, k) ≥ m− k.
Proof. We consider the cyclic profile Cyc:
Cyc P (m = 5, k = 2)
x1 x2 . . . m− 1 m
x2 x3 . . . m x1
x3 x4 . . . x1 x2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
m x1 . . . m− 2 m− 1
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
x2 x3 x4 x5 x1
x3 x4 x2 x5 x1
x4 x5 x2 x3 x1
x5 x1 x2 x3 x4
Now, let P be obtained fromCyc by the following operations for every vote inCyc:
– if x1 is not in the top k positions in the vote, we move it to the last position (and
move all candidates who were below x1 one position upward)
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– if x2 is not in the top k positions in the vote, we move it to the (k + 1)th position
(and move all candidates who were between position k + 1 and 2’s position one
position downward).
For instance, for m = 5, k = 2, we get the profile P above.
Maximin(P ) = x2, and the Maximin scores of x1 and x2 in P are:
SMm(x1, P ) = 1 and SMm(x2, P ) = m− k.
Hence SMm(x2,P )SMm(x1,P ) = m− k.
Proposition 2. m− k ≤ R(Maximin,Maximink,m, k) ≤ m− k + 1.
This worst-case ratio is quite bad, except if k is close to m. However, arguably,
the maximin score makes less sense per se (i.e., as a measure of social welfare) than
a positional score such as the Borda count. Moreover, for maximin rule the obtained
lower bound (Lemma 6) matches the one given by Bentert and Skowron [3] (Section
4.3) which means that our top-k approximation of maximin is optimal.
Copeland
Again, for the Copeland rule, the ratio makes less sense, because the Copeland score
is less meaningful as a measure of social welfare.5 Still, for the sake of completeness
we give the following result:
Proposition 3. R(Copeland,Copelandk,m, k) =∞.
Proof. Let P be the following profile:
– Pk contains two votes x1x2 . . . xk, and one vote L for each ordered list of k candi-
dates among m.
– P is obtained by completing Pk by adding x1 (resp. x2) in last position (resp. in
position k + 1) when it is not in the top-k positions.
In Pk, the winner for Copelandk is x1. In P , the Copeland winner is x2. Now, with
respect to P , the Copeland score of x1 (resp. x2) is 0 (resp.m−1), hence the result.
The obtained worst-case bounds are rather negative: very negative for Copeland and
maximin, less so for Borda, and even less so for Harmonic.6 However, the maximin and
Copeland scores make less sense as a measure of social welfare than positional scores.
Now, we may wonder whether these worst cases do occur frequently in practice or
if they correspond to rare pathological profiles. The next two subsections show that the
latter is the case.
5 Moreover, there are several ways of defining the Copeland score, all leading to the same rule.
However, this has no impact on the negative result below, as long as a Condorcet loser has
score 0.
6 As Ranked Pairs is not based on scores, it was not studied here.
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5.2 Average Case Evaluation
We present the evaluation of the approximation ratio using data generated from Mallows
φ model. For each experiment, we draw 10000 random profiles, with m = 7, n = 15,
and let φ vary.
Fig. 6 shows results reflecting the approximation ratio for truncated rules when
using Mallows model. Our results suggest that, in practice, results are much better than
in the worst case where best results are obtained by Harmonic, followed by Borda and
finally Maximin.
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Fig. 6: Mallows model: approximation ratio when n = 15, m = 7 and varying φ.
5.3 Real Data Sets
Again we consider 2002 Dublin North data (m = 12, n = 3662) with samples of n∗
voters among n (n∗ < n) where n∗ = {15, 100}. In each experiment 1000 random
profiles are constructed with n∗ voters; then we consider the top-k ballots obtained
from these profiles with k = {1, . . . ,m− 1}. Again, the results are very positive.
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k
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Maximin
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k
(b) n = 100
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Fig. 7: Approximation ratio with Dublin North data set.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered k-truncated approximations of rules which take only
top-k ballots as input where we have considered two measures of the quality of the
approximation: the probability of selecting the same winner as the original rule, and the
score ratio. For the former, our empirical study show that a very small k suffices. For
the latter, while the theoretical bounds are, at best; moderately encouraging, our exper-
iments show that in practice the approximation ratio is much better than in the worst
case: our results suggest that a very small value of k works very well in practice. Many
issues remain open. Especially, it would be interesting to consider top-k approximations
as voting rules on their own, and to study their normative properties.
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